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Book Review
Forgiveness and Revenge, Trudy Govier. London: Routledge, 2002. Pp. x + 205. Hardback. ISBN: 0-
415-27855-4
Notwithstanding its title, Trudy Govier's book is much more about forgiveness than it is about revenge.
Chapter 1 is the first of two chapters about revenge, in which Govier argues that seeking revenge is
objectionable for both practical and moral reasons. Chapter 2 is a rejection of group revenge. These
chapters set the stage for Govier's thesis in the remaining six chapters that forgiveness releases a victim
of injustice from bitterness and resentment that is backward-looking and unhealthy, and that political
forgiveness enables parties in a conflict to achieve reconciliation and sustainable peace.
Along the way, Govier addresses some of the central issues concerning forgiveness. Is a forgiver
condoning the wrongdoing? Can forgiveness be unilateral, that is, without acknowledgement and
repentance from the wrongdoer? Can groups as well as individuals forgive? Are there atrocities that are
so monstrous as to be unforgivable? Some of these issues have been discussed in other philosophical
writings. Govier is aware of the views of these writers, discusses them, and presents her own take on
their ideas.
Chapter 3 explores what is involved in forgiveness. Govier rejects the argument that resentment should
not be overcome as it could ground a sense of justice, for the reason that resentful people are vindictive
towards others and preoccupied only with themselves. She also distinguishes between forgiving and
forgetting. Chapter 4 is about the topic of unilateral forgiveness for both individuals and groups. Govier
argues that there are ethical reasons to forgive those who have not repented, as respect for persons is
incompatible with continued resentment and ill-will towards them. She also suggests that unilateral
forgiveness may initiate acknowledgement by the offender and lead to eventual reconciliation.
Chapter 5 deals with the possibility of forgiveness in politics, addressing three forms of skepticism about
forgiveness between groups. Govier argues that groups can be moral agents, with feelings, attitudes and
beliefs, and can suffer wrongful harm. She denies that only the primary victim is entitled to forgive, and
argues that the ability to forgive is within reach of most ordinary human beings, not just moral saints
such as Nelson Mandela. Chapter 6 is concerned with the possibility that there are deeds, such as Nazi
genocidal crimes against Jews, which are too atrocious to be forgiven. Govier utilizes South African
Archbishop Desmond Tutu's distinction between the wrongdoer and his wrongful deeds, to deny that the
monstrous character of acts can be used to show the perpetrator to be "entirely lacking potential for
positive change." She suggests that there are situational factors that may lead ordinary people to act
badly.
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Chapter 7 continues the argument that moral transformation is possible, no matter how badly a person
may have acted. Govier rejects John Kekes' thesis that "some people have permanently evil characters
and deserve to be treated accordingly." Instead, she thinks that human beings always have the ability to
reflect on the merits of their actions and to change their characters and habits. To believe otherwise is to
make the mistake of accepting a Myth of Pure Evil. Finally, in Chapter 8, Govier turns to the concept of
reconciliation, mostly presented in a political context. Obstacles to forgiveness in politics are discussed,
including non-acknowledgement of crimes, the 'lure of the ethnic tent', and the temptation to assert moral
superiority by claiming victimhood.
Govier's book is written in a way that is accessible to non-philosophers, and philosophers who need an
introduction to the ethics of forgiveness will find it a good place to start. But readers with a
philosophical interest in the topic should be alerted to the fact that Govier relies more on drawing
conclusions from selected examples than in providing either a philosophical analysis of the concept of
forgiveness, or an examination of alternative moral theories of forgiveness.
Part of the explanation for her approach to the topic by way of examples can be deduced from the
background to the book. As Govier tells us in the Preface, her "interest in forgiveness in politics was
stimulated by a trip to South Africa in March 1997." She has since worked closely and co-written papers
with Wilhelm Verwoerd from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and his input
into the book is clear from the many references and examples attributed to him. Although Govier's book
begins with individual revenge and forgiveness, there is a sense in which she has generalized from
political forgiveness that had been exemplified (for her) in the South African experience.
Is individual and political forgiveness basically the same concept? Govier recognizes the need to show
that groups could be the subjects and objects of forgiveness (p. 87). It is necessary to show that "a group
has the capacity to act which is distinct from that of unrelated individuals," that people can be harmed as
a group, and that groups can have beliefs, attitudes and feelings. The five pages that she devotes to this
challenge are not quite sufficient for the task. Relying on an idea from Larry May, Govier provides
examples to show that there are "actions that cannot be performed by individuals acting alone," and
therefore are attributed to a group. This is true of choral singing, for instance, but the argument overlooks
what makes a group an agent. An individual alone cannot fight a boxing match, but is boxing a group
activity as opposed to an activity in which more than one person has to individually participate? If
cooperation or joint intentions are necessary for group agency and responsibility, then it may not be so
easy for Govier to attribute wrongdoing and forgiveness to a group in every instance of political conflict.
Govier's examples of harms to groups concern individuals harmed because of their group affiliation.
What she calls secondary and tertiary victims of harm are individuals who are indirectly harmed. But she
has not shown that there is any possibility of harming a group over and above, and not reducible to, the
harm to individuals. Finally, Govier thinks that groups can have beliefs, attitudes and feelings because
otherwise, "what the group is doing does not make sense." The problem is that this is simply an
assumption: she has not shown that individual beliefs, attitudes and feelings cannot be sufficient to make
sense of group action. In fact, this seems to be the case for her example of mob action in the storming of
the Bastille.
Contrary to Govier, individual and political forgiveness may differ also in moral justification. She has a
problem, I think, showing that it is morally better, not just practically healthier, for an individual to
forgive. Concerning bilateral forgiveness where the wrongdoer shows repentance, Govier writes, "In
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forgiving the offender, the victim acknowledges him as a human being with worth, dignity, and the moral
freedom to change his ways" (p. 49). Firstly, I think that the moral necessity of respecting the wrongdoer
does not always support forgiveness. Secondly, Govier's preference for Kantian morality is a reflection of
her implicit acceptance of Christian ideas, thereby limiting the generalization of her argument to
examples other than those chosen by her.
To respect a person as an autonomous agent is to hold that person responsible for his actions. Kant
advocated retributive reasons for punishment for the reason that a responsible wrongdoer deserves to be
punished. Govier argues that respect for persons also entails a willingness to allow the wrongdoer a fresh
start in life. An agent should be distinguished from his actions, and not be labeled by his past deeds.
Now, it may be that because there is no further interaction between victim and wrongdoer, the latter does
not depend on the forgiveness of the former to make a fresh start. It may be sufficient for the wrongdoer
to pay his dues and commit himself to a new beginning. Moreover, the argument that victims should
allow the wrongdoer a fresh start does not apply to unilateral forgiveness where the wrongdoer does not
acknowledge his misdeed. If the latter does not think that he has done wrong, the forgiveness of the
victim may actually be considered disrespectful of persons (as Govier in fact recognizes in an example on
p. 46).
Govier takes pain to stress that the ethical basis for forgiveness is secular. Although she does discuss
'forgivingness' as a virtue, she clearly accepts the Kantian idea of respect for persons as the correct moral
view: "Morality is about how we treat each other as persons" (p. 165). But she also notes, "there is a
stronger emphasis on forgiveness, and a greater stress on unconditional forgiveness, in Christianity than
in Judaism" (p. 101). As mentioned, the central example on which Govier builds her account of
forgiveness is that of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, that was set up by
President Nelson Mandela, a professed Christian, and chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. The actions
of these men were based on Christian ideas, and the example may be rather exceptional. Why shouldn't
we generalize from Simon Wiesenthal's attitude towards forgiveness instead? Moreover, Govier's appeal
to Kantian ethics as a secular moral theory overlooks the fact that Kant's view developed in the context of
a Christian society.
With respect to political forgiveness, Govier sees it as necessary for reconciliation and peaceful co-
existence. The problem is that by arguing from examples, she only shows that forgiveness may foster
reconciliation, and not that there is no other way to bring the latter about. A further problem is that the
examples are not entirely convincing. It is too early to tell whether reconciliation has been successful in
South Africa, and in other examples, she seems to be presenting a counterfactual case: that people would
have reconciled had they been prepared to forgive. Another problem is that she has assumed and has not
shown that reconciliation through forgiveness is morally better than its alternatives. Perhaps it is more
important for a group to maintain an identity, even one that is based on victimhood. Perhaps it is more
important that monstrous crimes be unforgiven to emphasize their severity, or to deter such crimes from
being committed again. Perhaps a willingness to forgive is incompatible with justice. (Govier raises some
of these possibilities herself.)
The book is replete with examples, which are of great value to stimulate moral and philosophical
thinking. It is a pity that Govier has not incorporated more philosophical discussion from different
theoretical perspectives to accompany the examples. Instead, she interprets them simply as illustrations of
her own view. But one thing I do like about the examples provided in the book is their range in terms of
history and geography. For American readers, there is much that can be learned here about the nature of
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conflict in other parts of the world.
I have avoided mention of the events of September 11, as Govier had written the book before they took
place (but states in her Preface that these events in 2001 did not give her reason to change her mind).
One worrying aspect of how things have turned out since the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center
in New York City is the lack of perspective and context for Americans to evaluate their response. Many
of the examples from other parts of the world that are chronicled in Govier's book will challenge
Americans to appreciate the complexities of the moral issues of forgiveness, resentment and revenge, that
go beyond a simplistic comparison with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. (I do not mean that all
Americans need this broadening of perspective, since among them are such moral exemplars as former
President, international statesman and Nobel Peace prizewinner Jimmy Carter.)
I therefore conclude my review of Govier's book with a few quotations that have direct relevance to
serious moral thinking in the post-September 11 world, about reasons to go to war, and about the
divisions between people of different races and religions:
"What is wrong with revenge is that to act as agents of revenge, we have to indulge and cultivate
something evil in ourselves, the wish to deliberately bring suffering to another human being and
contemplate that suffering for our own satisfaction and enjoyment." (p. 13)
"Agents of revenge communicate a fearsome message…inspiring terror and hatred, not one of
concern for humanity and respect for the rule of law and human rights." (p. 35)
"People engage in seriously wrong, or evil, acts because they find those acts useful or necessary in
pursuing personal or ideological goals and do not take seriously the harm done to others." (p. 126)
"A self-serving, 'us-first' victim perspective according to which our victimhood is most paramount
for our policy and more urgent than the victimhood of anyone else should be strongly contested in
public debate. Even in the wake of immense tragedy and shock, such a perspective is likely to have
the baneful effects of propping up the Myth of Evil, falsely polarizing groups in conflict,
misrepresenting issues of policy, and supporting rash retaliatory moves that will worsen the
problems they seek to eliminate." (pp. 154-5)
Govier's book has earned a qualified endorsement from me, but an endorsement nevertheless. For clearly,
her heart is in the right place, and the examples in her book will stimulate readers to fill in the gaps in
argumentation with their own philosophical analyses and reasoning.
David K. Chan
University of Wisconsin - Stevens Point
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